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The role of nuclear energy
 in Brazil 
Joaquim Francisco de carvalho
   Introduction
The hisTory of nuclear energy in Brazil begins in the mid-1930s, when to set the teaching and research standards of the newly created University of são Paulo at a high level, the state government hired eu-
ropean professors and researchers from several fields of expertise and founded 
the school of Philosophy, sciences and Letters of the University, with Physics, 
Mathematics, science, humanities, earth sciences, Chemistry and Biology de-
partments. Later on (1956) the institute of Atomic energy (ieA) was created, 
to where some physicists from the Physics department of the school of Philoso-
phy, and engineers from the Polytechnic school were relocated.
in 1979 the ieA was transferred to the jurisdiction of the secretariat of 
industry, Trade, science and Technology, under the name of institute of energy 
and Nuclear research (iPeN).
Currently iPeN is managed by the National Nuclear energy Commission 
(CNeN), but remains linked to the University for graduate education purposes.
The Center for Nuclear energy in Agriculture was established in 1966, 
at the school of Agriculture of the University of são Paulo, in Piracicaba (sP).
in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s the federal government created in rio 
de Janeiro the Brazilian Center for Physics research, the National research 
Council, the National Nuclear energy Commission, the institute of radiation 
Protection and Dosimetry and the Nuclear energy institute.
The radiological research institute was created in 1953 in Belo hori-
zonte, linked to the Federal University of Minas Gerais, where the Thorium 
Group was set up in 1965, with the mission to develop the conceptual design 
of a heavy water moderated reactor, based on the thorium cycle (Brito, 1968).
The project was placed in the framework of the France-Brazil technical 
cooperation initiative and was included in the program that assessed the feasibil-
ity of thorium and heavy water reactors of the French Commissariat à l’energie 
Atomique. however, due to budgetary constraints, the project was ultimately 
cancelled when the Brazil-Germany Nuclear Agreement it was signed.
subsequently, the radiological research institute was transferred to Nu-
clebras (see below) and then to the National Nuclear energy Commission when 
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Nuclebras was closed. The Commission, which had been created in 1959, was 
already preparing a preliminary study for the construction of a nuclear plant in 
the central-south region of the country, but the comparative advantage of hy-
droelectric plants stopped the project from moving forward.
in 1971 the government decided to build a 750 MW nuclear power plant 
in the municipality of Angra dos reis, state of rio de Janeiro, creating for 
that purpose the Brazilian Nuclear Technology Company, whose mission was 
later expanded to include the planning and implementation of a nuclearpower 
program in the country. in 1975 the company was replaced by NUCLeBrAs 
(Brazilian Nuclear enterprises), already in the climate of the negotiations that 
led to the nuclear agreement with Germany.
The new company, which had been created to promote the development of 
the nuclear industry in Brazil with the technical assistance of Germany, ended up 
limited to coordinating an equipment import and personnel training program for 
the construction of two nuclear powerplants in Angra dos reis and a heavy com-
ponents manufacturing facility in itaguaí, state of rio de Janeiro (Carvalho, 1987).
The Brazilian experience in nuclear energy 
Nuclear energy was first used in Brazil in the early 1950s in biomedical 
radioisotope applications for biomedical purpose. in 1959 the Atomic energy 
institute  was already producing radiopharmaceuticals.
The Center for Nuclear energy in Agriculture conducts research for the 
use of radioactive tracers in the study of fertilizer absorption and plant metabo-
lism, and for the application of radioisotopes in the study of metabolic phenom-
ena in beef and dairy cattle.
in the Brazilian industry radioisotopes have been used routinely since the 
1960s, for fault detection, quality control and production control, particularly 
in the metallurgical and mechanical construction industries.
Brazil has more than 8,000 km of Atlantic Coast, and it is therefore only 
natural that the Brazilian Navy should be equipped with a fleet with sufficient 
scope of action and autonomy to patrol and defend the Brazilian territorial sea 
from predatory fishery fleets and weapon and drug dealers. it was in this context 
that an experimental center was established in iperó, são Paulo, in 1988 - a co-
operation between the Nuclear and energy research institute and the Brazilian 
Navy - with the aim to prepare the basic design of a marine propulsion system 
and develop experience in area of  the nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium 
enrichment stage. The center does not receive support from abroad nor does 
it rely on any of the countries that currently hold enrichment technology. its 
facilities include a pilot plant for the conversion of yellow-cake into uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6); a workshop for precision mechanics in which various com-
ponents of the prototype reactor are machined; an equipment assembly shop; 
an industrial demonstration base for the manufacturing of ultra centrifuges and 
cascades developed at the center; and an  isotopic enrichment laboratory.
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Due to budget constraints, work at this center moves slowly. however, 
thanks to it Brazil has already mastered all stages of the fuel cycle, and has also 
developed the prototype of a nuclear propulsion reactor.
Fallacies and facts about nuclear energy
All activities related to industrial, biomedical and agricultural applications of 
nuclear energy and the uranium enrichment project are well accepted by society. 
however, the establishment of nuclear power plants generates much controversy, 
triggered particularly by NPP component manufacturers and service providers, 
who manipulate citizens and disseminate fallacies through misleading arguments.
some of the arguments often seen in these manufacturers’ brochures and 
even in official statements by authorities in the sector are described below, fol-
lowed by the corresponding facts, which seldom are remembered.
The fallacy: Nuclear plants can guarantee the supply of electricity for an unlimited time.
The fact: Uranium ore reserves are finite and their exploitation depends 
on petroleum-based fuels to power uranium ore extraction and transportation 
equipment. however, the known reserves of this ore may last long enough 
for the development of technologies that enable the use of renewable energy 
sources. in the transition period, nuclear power plants can meet the electricity 
demand in countries that do not have a safer and more economical alternative.
The fallacy: Nuclear plants do not emit Co2 into the atmosphere.
The fact: The operation of a nuclear plant does not cause Co2 emissions. 
however, carbon dioxide is emitted continuously at all stages of the nuclear 
fuel cycle, from the mining uranium oxide to the production of fuel elements. 
There is also a marginal emission of Co2 from the construction and installation 
of nuclear power plants.
The fallacy: The risk of accidents related to nuclear power plants is negligible.
The fact: There is a one in a millionth chance of a serious accident oc-
curring in the primary circuit due to the leakage of radionuclides to the envi-
ronment in nuclear plants such as Angra. These plants are equipped with pres-
surized light-water reactors (PWr) in which the fuel elements (where nuclear 
fission reactions occur) are inside a pressure vessel, which is isolated from the 
environment by a double barrier.
The inner barrier, made of vanadium alloyed steel, is 2.5 centimeters thick 
and waterproof. The outer barrier, made of concrete, is 1.5 to 2 meters thick. 
The air layer between the two is maintained at a pressure below atmospheric 
pressure, so that if any failure occurs in the pressure vessel and the inner bar-
rier, possible leaks will be absorbed before they reach the outside environment. 
Thus, the likelihood of a serious accident is minimal, but not negligible. And 
nuclear accidents take dimensions that other accidents do not. They propagate 
through space (entire regions are contaminated and have to be evacuated and 
closed) and time (several decades). A plane crash for example affects passengers, 
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and regardless of how traumatic it may be, it is an accident that ends at the place 
and time at which it occurs. An accident in a nuclear plant only starts at the 
time and place at which it occurs. years later, hundreds of people will sustain the 
injuries and damages induced by exposure to ionizing radiation, as it is still hap-
pening with the populations that remained in the cities close to Chernobyl, as a 
result of the accident - and the same is expected to happen in the case of Fuku-
shima. Thus, in the event of major accidents such as these, the risk (probability 
versus severity) of injury to persons and damage to public and private property 
is incalculable. That is why insurance companies refuse to cover such claims in 
full and the losses always befall on the affected populations.
The fallacy: Nuclear waste becomes harmless in a short time.
The fact: Thirty years after being removed from the reactor, spent fuels 
(fission products, actinides and activation products) emit about 6 percent of the 
radiation they used to emit and have 0.2 percent of their thermal power. During 
that time they are stored at the plant site itself. But there is no definitive solu-
tion for the final disposal of high-activity waste removed therefrom. And even 
in small doses, ionizing radiation has a cumulative effect on living organisms 
which, if continuously exposed, are subject to chromosomal aberrations and 
cancerous lesions.
The fallacy: Nuclear plants are invulnerable to terrorist attacks.
The fact: Any industrial facility is vulnerable and nuclear plants are no excep-
tion. it all depends on the rigor with which the facilities are monitored and protected.
The fallacy: Fuels irradiated in nuclear plants are not suitable for terrorist 
groups to manufacture atomic bombs.
The fact: Terrorist groups do not need atomic bombs. They just need to 
get hold of fuel irradiated in a nuclear plant to have access to highly active fission 
products such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, and actinides such as plutoni-
um-239 and plutonium-240, which are also highly active and toxic. Therefore, 
they can threaten to spread these products over populated areas. To prevent 
such acts, a strong and costly police apparatus needs to be institutionalized.
The fallacy: Brazil should invest in nuclear plants because it has one of the 
largest uranium reserves in the world.
The fact: it makes no sense to invest in nuclear plants - which are uneco-
nomical in Brazil - just to exploit uranium reserves, since the country can generate 
sustainably, in an integrated water-wind system, all the electricity it consumes and 
will consume when the population stabilizes. As for uranium, it would be strategi-
cally more rational to process it up to the enrichment stage and export part of it.
Hydroelectric plants vs. nuclear plants in the expansion of the Bra-
zilian electric system  
The expansion of the electric system should be assessed and decided in the 
light of criteria based on the country’s reality as regards its resources available, 
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technological development and economic capacity - but never under the influ-
ence of lobbies from the coal, natural gas or nuclear energy industries.
in Brazil, the debate over the expansion of the electric system has been 
skewed in favor of nuclear energy, natural gas and recently even coal, against 
renewable and clean alternatives such as hydropower and wind power.
in 2009, only 29.6 percent of the Brazilian hydroelectric potential was 
being used, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Brazilian hydroelectric potential
Hydroelectric potential and use thereof GW %
Plants in operation (potential in use) 79.3 29.6
Potential to be tapped 171.0 63.8
Subtotal 250.3 93.3
Potential of Small Hydroelectric Plants 17.5 6.6
Total 267.8 100.0
Source: ePe (2010).
The North - essentially Amazon - holds 65 percent of the untapped po-
tential, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 – Geographic distribution of the potential to be tapped
Region North Northeast Central-West Southeast South
% 65 3 3 8 21
Source: ePe (2010).
This region, which is rich in strategic minerals, is a breeding ground of activist groups 
strongly opposed to the construction of hydropower plants. some of these groups have 
the support of mining companies and others interested in building coal and nuclear plants.
suppose that for social and environmental reasons the plans for expanding 
the electric system were redesigned so as to limit to 80 percent the hydroelectric 
potential to be tapped in the Amazon - and that the hydroelectric plants to be 
built in that region flooded 0.2 km2 / MW.
Table 3 shows that this is a conservative assumption because, except for 
solteira island, some existing facilities in other regions or under construction in 
the Amazon itself have a much lower flooded area/installed power ratio.
even so, Brazil can add a capacity of 148.7 GW to the existing 79.3 GW. With 17.5 
GW from small hydropower plants, the total hydroelectric capacity will  be 245.5 GW.
it is reasonable therefore that Brazil should use the hydroelectric potential 
of the Amazon in order to have a clean and sustainable electric system.
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Table 3 – Flooded Area /installed Power
PLANT Flooded area (km2) * Power (MW) A/P (km2/MW)
Itaipú 1,400 14,000 0.10
Jupiá                   330 1,411 0.24
Solteira Island                1,239 3,230 0.39
Campos Novos                     27 880 0.03
Chapecó                     90 885 0.10
Jirau                   258 3,450 0.08
Santo Antônio                   271 3,150 0.09
* includes the area already occupied by the river at the reservoir site. 
Source: eletrobras.
in the Amazon, rationally hydroelectric plants scaled along the rivers 
should be favored, as indicated in inventories and implementation programs 
that meet well defined socio-environmental and economic feasibility criteria. 
This requires regulating the matter through specific laws.
Mini hydroelectric plants operated by hydrokinetic turbines can also be established to 
supply small isolated loads, thus avoiding transmission lines from cutting through the forest.
Abhorrent projects such as Balbina and samuel should be disabled and 
their reservoirs, once emptied, converted into biological reserves.
Through a smart and strictly enforced energy policy, public companies and 
companies in the electricity generation industry should become the strongest 
defenders of the Amazon ecosystem, as changes caused by deforestation would 
jeopardize the flow of rivers, thus making the plants themselves unfeasible. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from hydroelectric reservoirs are owed especially 
to the decomposition of organic matter and would be much lower if those respon-
sible for the construction of the plants would pre-clear the areas to be flooded and 
remove all wood and organic waste to non-flood areas. in dry seasons, when the 
reservoir level drops, the sludge accumulated at the edges should be removed to be 
used as fertilizer in local family farming based on case by case agronomic studies.
simple guidelines such as these could lead to a productive and profitable 
activity for local residents willing to participate in mainstream economics.
At the same time, emissions from hydroelectric reservoirs would be re-
duced to those from any natural lake.
however, environmental NGos choose to take a fundamentalist position 
based on the dogma that the Amazon is untouchable.
Admittedly, Amazonian ecosystems are delicate, but that does not mean 
they will stop evolving and remain indefinitely in their primitive condition - if 
one can speak of primitive condition for systems that have been evolving for 
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billions of years, as all terrestrial ecosystems have. With or without dams, indig-
enous peoples (who were part of the Amazon ecosystem long before coloniza-
tion) will continue to change the nature through logging and burning, which 
are traditional activities in their agricultural system. And there are also mining 
companies, ranchers and agribusiness.
*  *  *
in addition to one of the largest hydropower potentials in the world, Bra-
zil has very favorable conditions for the use of wind energy.
The Brazilian hydroelectric system currently operates with a capacity fac-
tor of 0.5. This factor can be improved with the implementation of wind farms, 
provided that these are integrated to power plants in the form of a wind-hydro 
system, in which load dispatches enable part of the energy generated by the 
wind farms to be “stored” – i.e., accumulated in the form of water in hydroelec-
tric reservoirs - similarly to the thermal-wind grid in some european countries, 
where wind energy enables saving natural gas or fuel oil (Ummels, 2008).
According to a survey conducted in 2001 by the research Center for en-
ergy, eletrobras, together with the Camargo-schubert Wind energy and True 
Windows solutions companies, the Brazilian wind potential for winds with aver-
age speed higher than 7 m/s and turbines installed on 50-meter high towers is 
143.47 GW (Table 4). recent studies show that with higher towers the poten-
tial can reach s much as 300 GW.
Table 4 – Wind potential (average wind speeds higher than 7 m/s)
REGION Cumulative area (km2) Installable Power (GW)
North 6,420 12.84
Northeast 37,526 75.05
Central-West 1,541 3.08
Southeast 14,869 29.74
South 11,379 22.76
BRAZIL 71,735 143.47
Notes:
1 - includes wind farms with a maximum land use density of MW/km2, which is a conserva-
tive figure.
2 – Does not include areas occupied by forests, lakes and rivers, or areas on the sea.
3 – includes mean performance curves of modern wind turbines found in the market, installed 
on 50-meter high towers.
Source: CresesB / Cepel / eletrobras (2001).
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Therefore, using only primary clean and sustainable sources, the intercon-
nected system would have a combined capacity of 389 GW, with a generation 
of 1,466 GWh x firm hour per year, assuming conservatively that the capacity 
factor of the integrated system will be 0.43 (weighted average of the capacity 
factors of each system, separately). The safety reserve of the wind-hydro system 
would be in the existing natural gas power plants, which would operate only 
during critical wind-hydro periods.
This system could still operate in synergy with biomass power plants, be-
cause as most of the Brazilian automotive fleet runs on ethanol fuel, surplus ba-
gasse  can feed small power plants, with a total combined capacity of around 15 
GW (Única, 2008). Although negligible for the energy sector, this contribution 
is interesting because it prevents distilleries from burning their surplus bagasse 
outdoors.
According to iBGe, the Brazilian population is expected to stabilize at 
215.3 million people by the year 2050, as indicated in Table 5.
Table 5 – revision of the projected population growth for Brazil 
Year Population (million)
2010 193.2
2020 209.9
2030 215.8
2040 219.2
2050 215.3
Source: iBGe (2008).
so, starting from that year the interconnected electric system will be able 
to provide permanently about 6.820 kWh per inhabitant per year. This means 
that without resorting to nuclear power, per capita consumption of electricity in 
Brazil will no longer match that of european countries with a high standard of 
living listed in Table 6.
Table 6 – electricity consumption per capita in europe, 2007 
COUNTRY CONSUMPTION (kWh/inhab/year )
France 7.328
Holland 6.695
Germany 6.663
United Kingdom 5.774
Source: energy statistics (2007).
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As the weather in Brazil is temperate, commercial, industrial and residen-
tial buildings do no require heating systems as in France, where these systems 
account for about 20 percent of electricity consumption (insee, 2009).
Without this burden Brazil could electrify many sectors that today rely on 
fossil fuels, starting from urban transport, currently based on cars and buses. 
This would help to reduce air pollution, therefore improving the quality of life 
of the population.
Any country with important hydroelectric potential and technical capacity 
to exploit it seeks to use it to the fullest before appealing to more expensive and 
environmentally unfriendly or dangerous alternatives, such as fossil fuels and 
nuclear plants. For example, hydropower accounts for 99 percent of electricity 
supply in Norway; 60 percent in Austria; 55 percent in switzerland; 50 percent 
in sweden; and 12 percent in France (hydro Power and Dams World Atlas, 
2001).
* * *
This article does not take into account the photovoltaic potential, which, 
thanks to significant technological advances in the fields of semiconductors and 
smart grids may, in the medium term, play a very important role in the Brazilian 
electric system.
To encourage the use of photovoltaic energy, developed countries like 
Germany, France, spain, Japan and the United states have implemented incen-
tive programs to lower their costs to competitive levels compared to traditional 
sources.
owing to this policy, a total capacity of 10.2 GW in individual photovol-
taic systems was installed in Germany in 2010 alone. 
The article does not consider the possibility of using municipal waste in 
mini- power plants either. According to the ePe, mini-power plants powered by 
urban waste could total a combined capacity of 11.4 GW by 2030 (ePe, 2010).
Sales strategy in the nuclear industry
Countries such as France and Japan already use their hydroelectric po-
tential to the fullest. Thus, to produce the electricity essential for the survival 
of their economies, they had no choice but to invest in the nuclear option - 
especially France, which is a highly electrified country. That is on the medium 
term, because on the long term they are investing heavily in the development of 
renewable sources.
France has 59 nuclear power plants operated by state-owned electricité de 
France (edF) generating more than 430,000 GWh per year, which represents 
about 78 percent of the electricity consumed in the country.
Many of these plants are more than 40 years old. Therefore, large invest-
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ments are expected to be made  in the coming years to deactivate and decommis-
sion old plants and build new ones to replace the entire nuclear capacity.
in 2005 the French government established new guidelines on energy 
policy and safety of nuclear facilities - and decided to invest in the development 
of a new generation reactor, the european Pressurized Water reactor (ePr), 
with the entry into operation of an initial 1.65 GW unit planned for 2015. After 
this  unit, 40 similar plants should be established to replace those that are near-
ing the end of their useful life (World Nuclear Association, 2009).
optimistic estimates indicate that the investment required to decontaminate sites 
and decommission old plants - and build new ones - will be in the order of  a trillion euros.
The economic viability of these investments entails electricity costs that 
could not be borne by the French economy.
To alleviate the problem, the nuclear industry seeks to apportion the costs 
of these investments in expanded markets to countries vulnerable to its lobby, 
even if they have sources of renewable, clean and more economical energy such 
as hydro and wind power.
With this objective in mind, component manufacturers and suppliers of 
services for nuclear power plants are adopting the strategy of encouraging the 
creation of forums and associations for the development of nuclear activities in 
the various countries with financial capacity to import these plants.
These associations are usually run by former directors or former employees of gov-
ernment agencies with easy access to government organizations from the energy sector.
in carrying out their activities, these associations try to interact with the 
most important universities in the country by participating in roundtables and 
seminars and publishing dissemination papers extolling the advantages of nucle-
ar power plants but concealing their disadvantages.
These publications influence public opinion and politicians holding tech-
nical positions in ministries. This partly explains the Brazilian government’s de-
cision, announced in october 2008, to invest in a vast nuclear plant construc-
tion program, neglecting the advantage Brazil enjoys of being able to generate 
all the electricity needed for its development using only primary energy sources 
that are renewable, clean ad more economical than nuclear energy.
in short, nuclear power plants are not economically competitive in Brazil, 
as indicated in Table 7 showing the cost of energy produced in typical plants in 
the country that operate from the various primary sources available.
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Table 7 – Cost of electricity and annual production by typical Brazilian plants 
PROJECT (Power) Energy cost Annual production* Construction time
Coal (350 MW) US$ 134 / MWh 1.534.000 MWh ~ 4 years
Nuclear (1,345MW) US$ 113 / MWh 10.258.000 MWh ~ 7 years
Natural gas (500 MW) US$ 79 / MWh 1.315.000 MWh ~ 3 years
Bagasse (12 MW) US$ 74/ MWh 63.000 MWh ~ 3 years
Hydroelectric (6,450 MW) US$ 46 /MWh 28.270.350 MWh ~ 5 years
* Capacity factors: hydro = 0.50; Nuclear = 0.87; Gas = 0.80; Coal = 0.50; Bagasse= 0.60.
Source: energy Policy (2009).
Table 7 takes into account the government subsidy to nuclear power 
plants (energy Policy, 2009).
Final remarks
As a result of the Manhattan Project introduced in 1942 by initiative of 
the U.s. government in its plan to develop the atomic bomb, nuclear power 
began to be treated as a matter of national security, subject to restrictive rules in 
relation to the information that is made public.
This had great influence in the civil nuclear industry - which partly ex-
plains its lack of transparency - and has also influenced the international Atomic 
energy Agency (iAeA), which was established in 1957 and follows a clearly 
biased corporate orientation in favor of increasing the share of nuclear energy in 
electric systems on all continents.
After the Fukushima accident, however, the arcane vault of the industry 
began to be open even in France, where nuclear plants account for 78 percent 
of the electricity generated in the country.
in the book La vérité sur le nucléaire published in June 2011, the former 
minister of the environment, Corinne Lepage, reveals that the cost of the ener-
gy generated in nuclear power plants are highly subsidized by the state and that 
all that is published about it is wrapped in a layer of deceptions and half-truths.
According to her, facts rarely disclosed to the public show that the companies 
Areva (manufacturer of components and provider of services for the installation of 
nuclear power plants) and edF (state company that generates, transmits and distrib-
utes electricity in France) will face serious difficulties caused, among other things, by 
the failure of the ePr reactor, for which orders were canceled by China and india.
Mrs. Lepage also reveals that in France, accidents that contaminated ground-
water - and that could have been catastrophic – occurred in nuclear power plants such 
Chooz in 1968; saint-Laurente-des-eaux in 1969 and 1980; Gravelines in 1989; 
Blayais in 1999; the reprocessing plant of la hage in 1981; and in 2008 at the Tricas-
tin site, where several facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle and a power center are located.
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The former minister condemns the shamelessness used to minimize the 
severity of nuclear accidents, in particular that of a catastrophe like Chernobyl, 
which caused the immediate death of dozens of plant workers and has made 
each year thousands of victims of ionizing radiation emitted by the high activity 
products scattered over vast areas of Belarus, Ukraine and russia. she finally re-
veals that contrary to what is boasted by the nuclear corporation, French public 
opinion is not unanimous, as opposition to nuclear power is considerably high 
in the country.
*  *  *
The accident in Fukushima cooled the rebirth drive that the nuclear in-
dustry had experienced in previous years.
in Germany, the country that holds the technology of the  Angra ii and 
Angra iii, seven nuclear plants have been disabled and the government has 
canceled plans for the construction of new ones, having decided also that all the 
others will be disabled and decommissioned by 2022. similar action is seen in 
Belgium, spain and italy.
however, yielding to the lobbying of the nuclear industry, Brazilian au-
thorities state that the plan to establish other nuclear power plants besides Angra 
dos reis will be fully maintained, in which they are supported by some journal-
ists, professors and economists of renown in their respective fields of expertise 
-  but who know nothing about energy.
Conclusions
No other country the size of Brazil has such renewable energy potential. 
As shown in this article, Brazil could  be the first large country in the 
world to have a fully sustainable electric system, in both environmental and 
economic terms. But this is being undermined by the lobbying of the nuclear, 
natural gas and coal industries.
in Brazil, there is room for nuclear energy in scientific research as well as 
in biomedical, industrial and agricultural applications - and naval propulsion.
The resources earmarked for nuclear power plants would bring greater ben-
efits to the country if channeled to the aforementioned applications - and to techno-
logical development in renewable energy; otherwise, we will continue to lag behind 
industrialized countries, which are already investing significantly in this area.
insisting on the construction of nuclear power plants is a paradoxical and 
obstinate attitude against technological development in the field of modern en-
ergy sources that are actually renewable and clean and should prevail in the 
future.
Finally, it is important to note that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, in 
its Article 21 - item XXiii- states that “ all nuclear activity within the national 
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territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by 
the National Congress.”
Moreover, in 1997 Brazil signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, thus renouncing any kind of activity related to the produc-
tion and use of nuclear energy for military purposes.
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abstract – This article reviews the history and describes the experience in nuclear ener-
gy in Brazil, showing that nuclear technology applied to biomedical sciences, industry 
and agriculture has been largely developed in this country, from the year 1950 on. Then 
the paper shows that Brazil can cover its electricity consumption with only renewable 
energy sources, without nuclear power plants. Finally, the arguments usually employed 
in the press, pro and against nuclear power plants are analyzed and some commercial 
and political aspects of the problem are commented. The sales strategy of the nuclear 
industry in Brazil is also commented.
Keywords: hydro and wind power plants versus nuclear and fossil power plants, sales 
policy of the nuclear industry.
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